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Abstract 
The probability of conviction commonly varies across different circumstances due to imperfect 
monitoring. Evidence of whether and how offenders exploit gaps in monitoring provides insight into 
the process by which deterrence is produced. We present an empirical test of temporal displacement 
of illegal discharges of oil from shipping, a major source of ocean pollution, in response to a monitoring 
technology that features variation in the probability of conviction by time of day. After sunset and 
before sunrise, evidence collected using airborne radar day-round becomes contestable in court 
because the nature of an identified spot cannot be verified visually. Using data from surveillance flights 
above the Dutch part of the North Sea during 1992-2011, we only find evidence for temporal 
displacement after 1999, with further tightening of the regulations. By that time, the overall level of 
discharges had been reduced considerably, making the observed temporal displacement relatively 
small in absolute levels. 
JEL-codes: K32, K42 
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Potential offenders often operate in an environment with a varying probability of detection. They may 
be less likely to get caught under certain circumstances, such as during the nighttime. A primary cause 
of the variation in the probability of detection are the particular characteristics of the monitoring 
technology used by law enforcement agencies.1 The human senses have their limitations and so do 
monitoring technologies. For instance, the technologies used in speed limit enforcement – including 
license-plate recognition, radar and laser – each have their own weaknesses. These are not a given, 
however, technologies evolve over time. Radar guns are gradually being displaced by laser guns to 
prevent a speeding driver from hiding in traffic, and single-point speed measurement is complemented 
with measurement over longer stretches to limit all-too-easy avoidance of speed cameras. 
When choosing a monitoring technology and the way it is deployed, law enforcement agencies face a 
dilemma that is more complicated than the standard case with a monitoring technology that produces 
a similar probability of detection across all circumstances (Becker 1968). In addition to the challenge 
of setting a probability of detection and penalty within one particular situation, say the daytime, an 
agency needs to choose a monitoring technology that produces a deterrent effect across a set of 
circumstances, say the daytime and the nighttime. Usually, none of the available technologies is 
equally effective under all circumstances. That is also not necessary because exploitation of gaps in 
enforcement is not a given. First, an offender will need to become familiar with gaps in monitoring. 
Potential offenders often have only a limited understanding of how law enforcement agencies go 
about their work. This explains why enforcement activity at a certain time and place has repeatedly 
been found to also affect illegal behavior at other times and places (so-called diffusion of benefits, see 
Clarke and Weisburd 1994). Second, the offender needs to devise an evasive strategy.2 This is not 
without its costs and regularly requires the development of new knowledge and skills (Cook 1986, 
Cornish and Clarke 1987). In other words, not the possible but the actual displacement of illegal 
behavior to circumstances with a relatively low chance of getting caught is of importance in choosing 
a monitoring technology. Empirical evidence on whether and how offenders exploit variation in the 
chance of getting caught is of direct importance for an effective enforcement strategy. 
The interaction between law enforcement and affected parties can be characterized as a repeated 
game. The game may be cut short by effective counter-measures by law enforcement, but these 
measures may be undermined eventually. The adaptive behavior of both offenders and law 
enforcement is a cat-and-mouse game involving constant pursuit, near captures, and repeated escapes. 
In practice, the sequence of moves and counter-moves may be slow in unfolding; the point is that the 
chain of action and reaction is an integral part of the process underlying deterrence, and its study should 
improve our understanding of how deterrence works (McCrary 2010). 
Evasive strategies may be particularly challenging in the context of the enforcement of environmental 
law. Legitimate business activities and activities that are in contravention of environmental law are 
                                                        
1 Another important cause of variation in the probability of detection is the behavior of victims. For instance, 
victims may vary in their propensity to report a crime to the police. This has been found to be relevant in the 
context of illegal working conditions, with illegal immigrants as particularly vulnerable to exploitation because 
they rarely report their employers to the authorities out of fear of deportation (Foo 1994). 
2 Evasive strategies include displacement of illegal behavior to times or places where law enforcement is less 
effective; other forms are a change in target, tactics and offense type (Cornish and Clarke 1987). 
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often jointly produced, providing continuous pressure to engage in criminal behavior. For instance, as 
in the case discussed in this paper, an environmentally harmful substance may be generated as a by-
product of a legal production process. With one way of illegal disposal of the substance closed off, the 
need to dispose of it is not diminished. If the legal alternative is sufficiently costly, then the potential 
offender may simply look for other ways of illegal disposal (Sigman 1998). Within the context of 
environmental crime there may be more of a ‘lump of criminal activity’ that seeks a way out than in 
other types of crime, even though the elasticity of environmental crime with respect to law 
enforcement activity has repeatedly proven to be negative rather than zero (Gray and Shimshack 
2011). 
Temporal displacement of illegal behavior in response to law enforcement is thought to be a common 
evasive strategy – since it requires less from the potential offender compared to other strategies such 
as a change in tactics – but it is also one of the least studied (Guerette and Bowers 2009). In this paper, 
we study temporal displacement of illegal discharges of oily waste from shipping. Worldwide, the 
shipping industry is subject to regulation of the disposal of environmentally harmful substances, 
including oil and oily mixtures. Radar-guided surveillance by aircraft and satellite is a broadly used 
monitoring technology to detect illegal discharges, next to port state control. Actual detection of oil 
discharges still relies on visual inspection, however, since radar also picks up other anomalies on the 
water surface. In the jurisdiction under study, the Netherlands, the courts only accept evidence from 
observers who are trained to detect the particular rainbow sheen of oil on the water surface. As a 
consequence, the probability of conviction is negligible during low-visibility conditions. Disposal of oily 
substances can easily be postponed for a number of hours and the shipping industry has long been 
suspected of illegally disposing in the nighttime and during adverse weather conditions (Meetkundige 
Dienst 1981, Crist 2003, Carpenter 2007: 162, HELCOM 2011). Temporal displacement of illegal 
discharges in response to this variation in the probability of being convicted has never been studied 
however, primarily because in most countries surveillance effort during the nighttime is at too low a 
level to collect meaningful data. This is known to be the case for Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, 
Poland, Russia and Sweden, but could apply to other countries as well. 
The Netherlands is unique in conducting relatively intensive nightly surveillance activities, allowing us 
to analyze temporal displacement.3 The Dutch part of the North Sea provides a good area of study 
because it is one of the busiest navigated seas in the world and also one of the most polluted seas 
(Camphuysen and Vollaard 2015). The data collection is unaffected by visibility conditions because it 
relies on radar. We develop a test for the presence of temporal displacement. For nightly discharges 
to be strategic in nature, a necessary condition is that the timing is robust to seasonal variation in the 
time of sunset and sunrise. These times vary widely over the year, with the time window between 
sunset and sunrise being some 6 to 7 hours in June and some 15 to 16 hours in December. 
We use detailed data on radar-identified spots on the water surface and on the flight paths of all Coast 
Guard surveillance flights for the Dutch part of the North Sea for the period 1992-2011. We combine 
the geographical data with meteorological data on wind speed, water temperature and air 
temperature. The focus on daily variation in the probability of radar-identified spots effectively 
eliminates measurement error from other substances that may also be picked up by radar but are not 
                                                        
3 Apart from collecting statistics on illegal discharges for all hours of the day, nightly surveillance is mainly 




oil, including subsurface sand banks, seaweed and algae blooms: the sources of false positives do not 
vary with the time of day. 
We find that until 1999 the general pattern of nightly discharges do not pass the test. The hour-by-
hour upswings in the probability of detecting a spot – a sign of a surge in illegal oil discharges – also 
happened in broad daylight, albeit often at night or in the early morning. This suggests that earlier 
suspicions of displacement confounded year-round daily routines on board that favored relatively late 
or early hours with strategic timing of discharges. Only after 1999, with further tightening of the 
regulations, the upswings were limited to the hours after sunset and before sunrise. On-board routines 
started to diverge between the seasons, in line with the variation in the time of sunset and sunrise. 
The findings suggests that after 1999 temporal displacement was all but complete.  
In absolute terms, we find temporal displacement to be limited over the study period. Temporal 
displacement only emerged after a major drop in illegal discharges during the 1990s, rendering it a 
relatively mild consequence of the monitoring technology that enforcement relied on: the human eye. 
In other words, most shipping companies chose to stop illegal discharges in the North Sea area rather 
than to displace them to the nighttime (allowing the possibility of displacement to other less-patrolled 
areas such as the Atlantic). 
The context of oil pollution from shipping is particularly relevant because ocean pollution is a major 
source of environmental degradation. The legal discharge of oil and oily wastes is a standard part of 
operations of a large sea-going vessel, and these discharges are internationally regulated. Some vessel 
operators opt to discharge oily wastes illegally, and these discharges cumulatively are an important 
and chronic contributor to ocean pollution (National Research Council 2003). Oil spills can present a 
hazard by causing damage and death to birds and marine mammals and by exerting a toxic stress on 
subsurface organisms. Oil dissolved in the water can be taken up by organisms and affect their 
physiology, behavior, reproductive potential and survival. Oil may also be transferred to the sediment, 
where it might persist for many years, and impact on organisms on and in the sea bed. Marine oil 
pollution remains a great environmental concern globally (National Research Council 2003, Gullo 
2011), even though the incidence of illegal oil discharges has been reported to have declined in some 
areas including the North Sea (Camphuysen 2010, Lagring et al. 2012), the Baltic Sea (HELCOM 2011) 
and the Pacific Ocean off the Canadian coast (Serra-Sogas et al. 2008). The policy relevance of the 
findings of this study extends beyond the confines of the Dutch part of the North Sea: many coastal 
countries in the western world use deterrence technology that is similar to the Netherlands, including 
the UK, the US, Germany, Belgium, Canada and France. 
This paper contributes to the literature on the dynamics of criminal behavior. Empirical evidence on 
the interaction between law enforcement and potential offenders is scant, which also applies to 
evidence on temporal displacement of crime in response to law enforcement activity (McCrary 2010).4 
In a review of empirical evaluations of crime prevention initiatives, Guerette and Bowers (2009) found 
that displacement and diffusion effects were only examined in half of all studies. Out of 574 evaluations 
that examined displacement and diffusion effects, temporal displacement was analyzed in only 5 
percent of cases. This is also typical for the literature on monitoring and enforcement of environmental 
                                                        
4 An exception is Jacob, Lefgren and Moretti (2007). They find evidence for temporal displacement of crime in 
response to weather shocks, which they explain by the presence of income effects for property crime and by 
decreasing marginal utility from violent crime in the amount of violent crime committed previously. 
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regulations. In their review of this literature, Gray and Shimshack (2011) do not discuss any empirical 
evidence on evasive strategies other than falsification of self-reported violations of regulations, which 
Telle (2013) finds to be a common practice. Better insight into how and when evasive strategies are 
developed can have a high pay-off. Heyes (1994) shows theoretically that an increase in enforcement 
resources while leaving opportunities to evade punishment unchecked may actually lower overall 
compliance, which is confirmed empirically in a study into avoidance of import duties (Yang 2008). In 
addition, effectiveness of monitoring and enforcement may be lower than it seems when evasive 
actions are not taken into account, which is relevant for addressing the question of how to cost-
effectively limit environmental degradation. Finally, I also contribute to the empirical literature on the 
effectiveness of measures to combat marine pollution from operational discharges. So far the evidence 
on what policies work in this area is limited.5 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the regulations 
governing the management of oily waste from shipping and their enforcement. Section 3 discusses the 
data. In section 4, we present the empirical test for the presence of temporal displacement. Section 5 
presents the estimation results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Regulation of oily waste disposal and deterrence technology 
Oily waste products from shipping are mainly generated by three processes. First, pre-treatment of 
high-viscosity bunker oil, which is often used as fuel in shipping, results in a relatively solid residue. 
This residue, called fuel oil sludge, consists of oil, water, and dirt. Second, in all ships, contaminated 
waste water, mainly from the engine room, gradually builds up at the bilge, the lowest space of the 
ship. This so-called bilge water contains a varying mixture of lube oil, fuel, water, solvents, detergents 
and other substances. Bilge water needs to be pumped out regularly to prevent the bilge wells from 
overflowing and to maintain stability of the ship. Third, the cleaning of cargo tanks of oil tankers creates 
oily slop.6 
A low-cost and time-saving solution to handle these waste products is to simply dispose the bilge 
water, the fuel oil sludge and the slop into the sea (Crist 2003, Gullo 2011). Up into the 1970s this was 
common practice. Even though the spills are small compared to accidental oil spills – ranging from less 
than 100 liters for minor bilge water discharges to dozens of tons for tank washings – spill size is not 
necessarily a good predictor of environmental impact (Burger 1993). These smaller discharges can have 
                                                        
5 Camphuysen (2010) finds that rates at which different types of beached seabirds are oiled are correlated with 
law enforcement activity in the habitats of these birds, suggesting a deterrent effect, but leaving open 
alternative explanations such as differences in shipping intensity. Lagring et al. (2012) correlate time-series 
data on possible oil spills from the Belgian Coast Guard with regulatory changes, and their findings suggest a 
positive impact, but the influence of other factors cannot be excluded. O’Hara et al. (2013) model how aerial 
surveillance efforts are related to the number of observed spills in the Pacific Ocean. They find lower levels of 
illegal discharges than predicted by the model in the area closest to the airbase of the surveillance aircraft, 
suggesting a deterrent effect from aerial surveillance – at least on discharges during the day. Close to all of the 
literature on marine oil pollution focuses on the prevention of non-intentional oil spills. See Knapp and Franses 
(2009) on the effect of mandatory changes in ship design; Gawande and Bohara (2005) on the effect of Coast 
Guard inspections and penalties; Epple and Visscher (1984), Cohen (1986, 1987) and Viladrich Grau and Groves 
(1997) on the effect of Coast Guard surveillance on oil spills during oil transfer operations within the harbor. 
6 Currently, oil residues are mostly removed by spraying the tanks with pure oil (crude oil washing), rather than 
water. However, about twice a year a tanker is washed with water to be able to perform inspections and 
maintenance, resulting in some 6,000 m3 of slop per tanker per year (Crist 2003: 12).  
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large detrimental effects on marine life because they contribute cumulatively more to oil pollution 
input into the marine environmental than accidental spills, and are more likely to occur at the wrong 
place at the wrong time (National Research Council 2003, Camphuysen 2010). The pollution is chronic, 
putting continuous pressure on ecosystems in and close to major shipping lanes. 
To limit environmental harm from shipping, a set of regulations was drafted in the 1973 International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), organized under auspices of the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO). After some modifications, and after ratification in most of 
the countries participating in the IMO, the regulations that relate to oil pollution came into force in 
1983. Close to all countries with some presence at sea are parties to the Convention. The regulations 
involve pollution standards, ship design standards, and mandatory self-reporting. The aim is to force 
the shipping industry to use alternatives to illegal discharges into the sea. Vessels have oil-water 
separation systems that remove the water component of waste products that build up during normal 
operations. Separated water should contain hydrocarbon concentrations of no more than 15 parts per 
million (15 mg per liter), which can be discharged legally while the vessel is at sea and underway. The 
oily slops that remain have to be stored for future disposal, which can occur legally in two ways. The 
first, most commonly used method of disposal is to incinerate oil sludge and other oily waste products 
in shipboard incinerators, which are present on most large vessels. The second method is to dispose 
sludge and slop at port reception facilities. 
Under current pollution standards, all discharges of oil in the North Sea area are prohibited. Only 
substances contaminated with less than 15 parts per million oil can be legally discharged. Prior to the 
North Sea becoming a Special Area in 1999, discharges of up to 100 parts per million were allowed 
outside the 12 miles zone. The ship design standards involve the fitting and proper functioning of an 
oil discharge monitoring and control system, an oily water separator, tanks for the storage of slop and 
sludge, and related piping and pumping arrangements. Shipping crews are also mandated to self-
report how they handled oily waste products (and movement of cargo oil) in the Oil Record Book, 
which can be inspected by the authorities when visiting the harbor. Finally, incineration of cargo oil 
residues is prohibited. MARPOL regulations also require countries to provide legal alternatives in the 
form of port reception facilities for oily waste products. 
The regulations are primarily enforced by aerial surveillance and port-side inspections. In this paper, 
we focus on aerial surveillance. Coast Guard aircraft conduct surveillance flights above the Dutch 
Continental Shelf on a daily basis. Most of the flights occur during the day (70 percent). Radar on board 
of the aircraft detects possible oil spills through anomalies on the water surface. For about a third of 
the surveillance flights, satellite images are also used to guide the aircraft to potential oil spills. The 
combination of satellite and airborne remote sensing technology allows monitoring of vast sea areas 
at day and night, under all sky conditions and under most weather conditions.  
All identified oil spots can be characterized as illegal, because oil spots containing less than 15 ppm are 
never detected by airborne radar; and oil spots containing less than 100 ppm are very unlikely to be 
detected (Dienst Noordzee 1992). The radar is fine-tuned to identify oil spots, but it is not perfectly 
accurate, particularly at very low and very high wind speeds. False positives occur when other 
phenomena produce similar anomalies on the water surface, including fresh water slicks, seaweed, 
algae blooms, and subsurface sand banks (Fingas and Brown 2012). Generally, after radar has detected 
a spot, the aircraft swerves back for a visual inspection and for an investigation of the size and thickness 
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of the spot. The monitoring technology did not undergo fundamental changes since it was first used 
about 25 years ago. The number of flight hours gradually increased from 600 to 1,200 per year between 
1990 and 1996 and has remained fairly constant since then. 
The chance of being convicted for an illegal oil discharge is remote. First, the Coast Guard aircraft are 
not in the air for 85 percent of time, and when in the air, it takes about five hours to cover all of the 
relevant area.7 Oil spills may have disappeared for the radar before the area is surveyed. The duration 
depends on local weather conditions including wind speed, air temperature and water temperature 
(Helmers 2002). Generally, spills disappear or at least become undetectable 1 to 7 hours after the 
discharge (given prevailing wind speeds of 2 to 6 Beaufort (ibid.)). The limited number of flight hours 
also means that shipping crews’ chances of observing a Coast Guard aircraft or having radio contact 
with the aircraft are very small. 
Second, even when Coast Guard aircraft observe an oil spill, it is difficult to link the spill with a particular 
vessel in the busy shipping lanes of the North Sea. The data collected by the aircraft show that in 9 out 
of 10 cases the offending vessel cannot be identified. In other words, the offender needs to be caught 
in the act or just after the act.  
Third, on the off chance that an offender is detected, the case may still be dropped because of a lack 
of evidence. In the Netherlands, for a prosecutor to proceed with a case, an aerial observer needs to 
have confirmed the illegal nature of the substance based on visual inspection from the air.8 The courts 
rely on the aerial observer’s ability to identify the specific appearance of oil on the water surface. In 
other words, all of the advanced monitoring technology can only be used to guide the aerial observer 
to a potential oil spill for a visual inspection. This is useful in and of itself, however, because it improves 
the efficiency of aerial surveillance. Clearly, the standard of evidence has large implications for the 
chance of being convicted. In low-visibility conditions, including the hours between sunset and sunrise, 
fog as well as heavy precipitation, the probability of conviction drops to zero. 
In the Netherlands, over the period 2006-2012, yearly some 10 to 15 vessels were identified as 
suspects of an illegal oil discharge. In about half of the cases, the prosecutor proceeded with the case. 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
Data on all radar-identified spots and the flight paths of all Coast Guard aircraft surveillance flights 
above the Dutch Continental Shelf during 1992-2011 were provided by the Netherlands Ministry of 
Infrastructure and the Environment. The data are part of the ‘VluVerO’-database and are unique in 
covering a long period.9 The original data are in GIS-format and have been transferred into a grid of 
2.5 by 2.5 kilometer. The grid is based on UTM31N-coordinates. We assume the airborne radar to cover 
an area of 20 km to the right and 20 km the left of the aircraft. Unit of time is an hour.  
                                                        
7 The chance that a discharge is detected is limited to the flight hours conducted: reports of oil spots by third 
parties such as other ships or civilian aircraft crossing the North Sea are exceedingly rare, and cases of a 
whistle-blower reporting an illegal discharge to the authorities, not unheard of in the US, seldomly occur in the 
Netherlands. 
8 In some countries, the standard of evidence is even higher. For instance, in Denmark, it is also necessary to 
provide a sample of the substance, which is obtained from an oil sampling buoy.  
9 We exclude spots identified by satellite only since data on the frequency of orbit and which area was covered 




For each grid cell we know when it was surveyed by airborne radar. We exclude grid cells that were 
not covered at least once by airborne radar during 1992-2011 (this involves 24m cell-hour 
combinations). We also excluded the very north of the Dutch Continental Shelf since it has very low 
shipping traffic intensity (this involves 2.6m cell-hour combinations). Finally, we excluded areas where 
not a single spot was identified during 1992-2011 (this involves 13m cell-hour combinations). The 
resulting data set relates to an area of 17,450 km2 – compared to 57,000 km2 for the complete Dutch 
Continental Shelf. These restrictions make the data more tractable and do not affect our estimation 
results. Within this area, on average each grid cell was surveyed 214 times per year during 1992-2011. 





All 6,610 spots that were identified during 1992-2011 were assigned to a grid cell. When matching 
spots to the grid, we allowed for a one-hour or two-hour difference between the time that a spot was 
observed and the time that the aircraft was noted to be crossing that grid cell. These differences could 
arise because aerial observers incidentally used Universal Time, the default in aviation, rather than 
local time in Amsterdam, the prescribed time standard for the database. The difference between the 
two is limited to two hours during daylight saving time and one hour otherwise. Further information 
on a spot, including the nature of the substance, its size and thickness, is incomplete, in particular 
during darkness, and not used in the analysis.  
 
Figure 2 shows the trend in the probability of detecting a spot during 1992-2011. Clearly, the trend is 
downwards. The suggested drop in illegal oil discharges is confirmed in counts of beached seabirds 
that are oiled (Camphuysen 2010) and in the trend in radar-identified spots in the German and Belgian 
part of the North Sea (Carpenter 2007, Lagring et al. 2012). The decline has been attributed to a range 
of factors including changes in ship design, better facilities for legal disposal in the harbor, 
strengthened port state control and greater environmental awareness of shipping crews (ibid.). 
Shipping intensity remained roughly stable when measured by the number of sea-going vessels visiting 





Figure 3 shows the incidence of radar-identified spots during 1992-2011 in the Dutch part of the North 
Sea. The areas with the highest incidence are concentrated in the three major shipping lanes along the 
coast and in the approaches towards the harbors of Antwerp, Rotterdam, Amsterdam and IJmuiden. 
This confirms that the data relate to discharges from shipping rather than oil from other sources, such 
as oil and gas exploration in the North Sea. Figure 3 shows that the area with the most oil and gas 
platforms, the southwestern part of the Friese Front (around coordinates 575000, 5900000) has a 
relatively low incidence of observed spots. 
                                                        
10 According to locally administered harbor statistics, the number of vessels visiting Rotterdam varied around 
30,000 per year during 1992-2011; the number of ships visiting Amsterdam around 4,700 during 1992-2005 





The time at which a spot was observed is usually not the time at which it was discharged (assuming 
that the spot is an illegal oil discharge). As discussed, oil spills remain on the water surface for a limited 
time only. This implies that a relatively high tendency to discharge at some hours will result in a build-
up of discharges during these hours, and a gradual phase out after these hours. In other words: 
discharges that are concentrated in time accumulate because they do not disappear immediately. 
Figure 4 shows the probability of detecting a spot by hour of the day in the raw data. The line with the 
black dots suggests that the probability of detecting a spot strongly increases after 6pm and starts to 
decline after 10pm. This suggests a tendency to discharge between 6pm and 10pm. The line with the 
open dots in Figure 4 shows that most flights are conducted at times that the probability of detecting 




We match the geographical data discussed above with meteorological data. The meteorological data 
are provided by the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI) and include air temperature 
and wind speed on an hourly basis. Measurements are taken at Lichteiland Goeree weather station, 
which is located 30 km off the coast, southwest from Hoek van Holland (the approach of Rotterdam 
harbor). The Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment provided data on the water temperature 
at the Europlatform weather station, 60 km off the coast from Hoek van Holland. We exclude 
observations at wind speeds lower than 1.5 m/s (1 Beaufort) and higher than 20.8 m/s (9 Beaufort). In 
these weather conditions, the radar is ineffective (see Section 3). This affects about 2 percent of 
observations. We assume similar water and air temperatures and wind speeds across the Dutch part 
of the North Sea, which is a reasonable approximation for our purposes according to the KNMI. The 
KNMI also provided the time of sunset and sunrise at 52°00' northern latitude and 5°00 eastern 




4. A test for temporal displacement 
It is cheaper and more expedient to discharge the oily waste products into the sea rather than to 
dispose them at the harbor or to incinerate them on board (Crist 2003, Gullo 2011). Temporal 
displacement of illegal discharges to hours with no chance of being convicted is straightforward since 
disposal of oily substances can easily be postponed for a number of hours.11 A similar evasive response 
may also be driven by a belief that surveillance is at lower levels during low-visibility conditions or a 
belief that discharges are more likely to be reported to the authorities by other ships and air traffic 
during high-visibility conditions. 
 
The descriptive statistics discussed in the previous section show that oil discharges are concentrated 
in the nighttime. That is not necessarily a sign of evasive behavior, however. The crews operate on a 
                                                        
11 Crews may also decide to discharge the products in areas with no chance of being detected, say somewhere 
on the Atlantic Ocean, but many ships navigate along the coast, and the operational discharges cannot always 
be postponed for several days. 
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rigid system of 4 or 6-hour watches; the ship is operational 24/7. A nightly routine may simply fit the 
schedule of the crew best. To identify whether the timing of discharges is the result of evasive behavior 
rather than considerations of other nature, we analyze whether the timing changes over the seasons. 
The time window for evading conviction is many hours shorter during the summer time than during 
the winter time. Nights are some 9 to 10 hours shorter in June than in December. A necessary condition 
for the general hourly pattern to reflect evasive behavior is that the timing should be robust to the 
wild swings in the time of sunset and sunrise during the year. Clearly, we can only distinguish strategic 
from non-strategic behavior if the discharges are not limited to the few hours that are dark regardless 
of the season. 
 
For the results of the test to be reliable, measurement error in the observation of oil spots should be 
orthogonal to the hour of the day.12 First, all the known sources of false positives either do not vary 
with time (subsurface sand banks, seaweed, fresh water slicks) or vary at a much slower time scale 
(algae blooms) (see Section 2). The only exception could be other illegal discharges that shipping crews 
like to hide from the authorities such as environmentally harmful cargo residues. These discharges are 
very rarely observed by the Coast Guard aircraft however, as evidenced by the data used in this paper, 
and therefore cannot explain daily patterns. We exclude times at which the radar does not work (very 
low and very high wind speeds). Second, it is reasonable to assume that false negatives are equally 
likely during the daytime and during the nighttime. Observation by radar is unaffected by the absence 
of daylight and anecdotal evidence from experienced aerial observers suggests that spots are rarely 
identified by visual inspection only.13 
 
The identified hourly pattern relates to aggregate behavior of all vessels navigating the North Sea. If a 
sizeable number of ships concentrate their illegal discharges at specific hours, then we will observe an 
upswing in the number of spots. This implies that we test for a general tendency for temporal 
displacement, allowing individual ships to diverge from the general pattern. 
 
A number of major events may have altered a tendency to discharge at night during 1992-2011. First, 
the greater enforcement effort since 1996 may have lowered this tendency. Second, illegal discharges 
became less permissible as of 1999 when the North Sea became a MARPOL Special Area – reflecting 
the particular sensitivity of this marine environment to oil discharges because of its shallowness. Since 
                                                        
12 Differences in shipping intensity or in types of vessels between day and night can be excluded as a source of 
bias. Commercial shipping is a 24/7 business, and both shipping intensity and the mix of vessels are roughly 
stable over the course of the day. The relatively great presence of pleasure craft during the day is not likely to 
lead to a downward estimation bias because they are responsible for only a tiny percentage of illegal oil 
discharges (about 1 percent, see Beco 2013: 6). 
13 The smaller surveillance effort during the night than during the day may be a source of measurement error in 
the probability of detecting a discharge. As worked out in O’Hara et al. (2013), the relationship between 
surveillance effort and detection probability may be s-shaped rather than linear. This is related to the fact that 
oil spots can be detected for only a limited number of hours after the discharge. At low (high) levels of 
surveillance effort, greater surveillance effort leads to a more-than-proportional (less-than-proportional) 
increase in the detection probability. Given the fact that oil spots tend to be on the water for some hours and 
the North Sea area is patrolled no more than once a day, our observations are likely to be at the left part of the 
s-shaped curve (for a discussion, see also Lagring et al. 2012 on the southern North Sea). In that case, the 
difference in the incidence of spots between the day and the night is even more pronounced than can be 
deduced from the data – in particular given a trend towards a greater share of small volume-discharges that 
disappear relatively quickly for the radar. Consequently, estimates of equation (1) may provide lower-bound 
estimates of the day/night pattern.  
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then, ship companies had to comply with the most stringent oil discharge provisions when navigating 
in the North Sea. This could have both lowered illegal discharges and increased displacement. The new 
regulations came only in effect from August 1999, which is why we assume that effects on illegal 
behavior, if any, can be identified as of the year 2000. Third, doing the right thing became easier with 
better port reception facilities for disposal of oily waste that were the result of the implementation of 
the EU Directive 2000/59/EC. Dutch law was brought in line with EU-regulations at the end of 2004. 
Volumes of legally disposed oily waste greatly increased as a result.14 This is likely to have lowered the 
rate of illegal discharges. In the analysis, we separately test for the presence of temporal displacement 
in each of the following periods: 1992-1995; 1996-1999; 2000-2004; 2005-2011. 
 
5. Estimation results 
As a first step, we graphically examine the hourly pattern in detected spots. We specify a linear 
probability model that flexibly estimates variation in radar-identified spots by hour of the day.15 To be 
able to detect seasonal variation in the timing of discharges, we allow the effects by hour of the day to 
vary between autumn/winter (September 22-March 20) and spring/summer (March 21-September 
21). A break-up of the year into more than two seasons is not possible because of the low incidence of 
detected spots. We estimate the following equation:  
 
      P(SPOTi,t) = HOURt AUTUMN/WINTERt α + HOURt SPRING/SUMMERt α´ + Xt β + δi + μj + λm + εi,t        (1) 
 
The dependent variable P(SPOTi,t) is the probability of detecting a spot at grid cell i and at hour t. We 
estimate the variation in this probability by hour of the day with the vector of hour-fixed effects HOURt. 
We allow these effects to vary between AUTUMN/WINTER and SPRING/SUMMER. Because of the 
seasonal swings in the time of sunset and sunrise, the time window for evading conviction is on average 
5 hours shorter during autumn/winter compared to spring/summer. Xt is a vector of observable factors 
that are related to the probability of detecting a spot and to the hour of the day, including water 
temperature, air temperature and wind speed. Wind speed is somewhat higher during the night than 
during the day. Temperatures are generally higher during the day than during the night. We do not 
know the exact nature of the relation between weather conditions and the dependent variable, which 
is why we also include quadratic terms for each of these three covariates. δi represents area-fixed 
effects that are constant over time, for instance whether grid cell i is inside or outside a major shipping 
route. μj represents the year-fixed effects, which picks up general shocks to the chance of observing a 
spot, such as any effects of the increase in surveillance effort in 1996. The month-fixed effects λm 
capture any seasonal effects that are constant over time such as algae blooms in the spring. εi,t is an 
error term. 
 
Figure 5 presents the results from estimation equation (1) for each of the four periods. The left vertical 
axis shows the probability of detecting a spot relative to 12pm. To relate the hourly changes in 
detected spots to the overall rate, the intercept is not set at 0 but at the average probability of 
                                                        
14 For instance, in the harbor of Rotterdam, disposal of oily waste from commercial shipping almost doubled 
from 131,650 m3 in 2004 to 227,569 m3 in 2011 (Lagring et al. 2012: 645). 
15 The findings are similar when estimating a logit model. Given the rarity of observed spots, I also estimated 
the logit model for rare event data suggested by King and Zeng (2001). Again, the results are similar (results 
available upon request). 
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observing a spot at 12pm during the respective time period. The right vertical axis shows the 
probability of darkness by hour of the day. The black line denotes the pattern in autumn and winter; 




The first graph, for the period 1992-1995, suggests that the timing of illegal discharges is not driven by 
variation in the time of sunset and sunrise. During both seasons, the upswings in the probability of 
detecting an oil-like spot are concentrated in the hours 5-11pm, 12-2am, and 7-8am, suggesting that 
these are popular times for illegal oil discharges. As discussed above, if discharges are concentrated in 
time, then the spills tend to accumulate, resulting in an increasing probability of observing a spot. Most 
of the upswing during spring/summer occurs in broad daylight, suggesting that the year-round on-
board routines have not been fine-tuned to avoid conviction. The identified pattern shows a close fit 
with the schedule of watches. Most of the action occurs during the watch of the chief engineer (6pm-
12am and 6am-12pm for vessels on a 6 hour watch system or 8pm-12am and 8am-12pm for vessels 
on a 4-hour watch system). Lower-level engineers seem to be involved to a lesser extent, given the 
relatively small upticks after midnight. To conclude, during 1992-1995, we do not find clear evidence 
for temporal displacement. 
 
The second graph shows that during 1996-1999 the pattern in detected oil-like spots for the two 
seasons are no longer as similar as they used to be. More of the wave in spots during the 
spring/summer-season is now concentrated in the nighttime. Some of the early-night peak during 
spring/summer still occurs before sunset, however. This suggests that temporal displacement, if at all 
present, is not widespread. The primary change is a drop in the overall level of discharges, not a 
displacement towards the nighttime. 
 
During 2000-2004, when regulations are more stringent than in previous years, close all of the upward 
swings in oil-like spots occur during the nighttime. The identified patterns diverge for the two seasons. 
The early-night wave in detected spots during spring/summer starts at 8pm, two hours later than 
during the autumn/winter, and at the average time of sunset during spring/summer. The early-
morning peak in spring/summer also stops right before sunrise, and also occurs three hours earlier 
than during autumn/winter. This suggests that if oily waste is discharged illegally, then it is done at 
times that conviction can be evaded. These signs of evasive behavior go together with a drop in the 
overall rate of detected spots by more than 50 percent compared to the previous period. Apparently, 
the stricter regime resulted in both greater deterrence of illegal discharges in the North Sea area and 
a stronger tendency to evade conviction.16 Some of the discharges may have been displaced to other, 
less-patrolled areas such as the Atlantic coast off France and the Bay of Biscay, but this spatial 
displacement effect has not been studied. The third graph also shows that the peaks become more 
                                                        
16 It could be that daily discharges are deterred and nightly discharges are not deterred. In that case, there is no 
temporal displacement of crime. This is not a plausible explanation for our findings, because oil discharges can 
be planned. It would imply that ships use legal and illegal alternatives interchangeably, which is implausible. 
For instance, the same ship that sails in the North Sea would put the oily waste in storage tanks during the day 
and dispose it at the harbor later (or incinerate the waste on board), but would illegally discharge oil at night. 
Clearly, if the option of an illegal discharge is in the choice set of the crew, it makes more sense to wait until 
after sunset rather than going through the effort of doing the right thing during the day. 
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accentuated. This is in line with a trend towards a higher percentage of relatively small discharges 
(especially in volumes between 1-10 m3). Small discharges disappear relatively quickly for the radar 
(Helmers 2002), resulting in a relatively steep downward slope after the accumulation of discharges. 
 
In the last period, 2005-2011, the rate of detected oil-like spots is even lower than in the previous 
period, probably as a result of the much-improved facilities for legal disposal in the harbor (see Section 
4). The daily pattern is similar, but less articulated than in the previous period given the lower rate of 
detected spots. The autumn/winter early night-uptick starts at 6pm, well after the average time of 
sunset in this season; the spring/summer early night-uptick starts at 10pm, also well after the average 
time of sunset. In the early morning, the pattern is reversed, with the major peak in the spring/summer 
season ending at 4am and in the autumn/winter season at 8am. 
 
As a second step, we test whether incidence of detected spots in the nighttime is statistically 
significantly different from the incidence in the daytime – while controlling for daily routines on board 
that are fixed across the seasons. We estimate the following equation: 
 
P(SPOTi,t) = α DARKNESSt + HOURt α + Xt β + δi + μj + λm + εi,t          (2) 
The variable DARKNESSt has a value of 1 after sunset and before sunrise and is 0 otherwise. The hour 




The first two columns of Table 2 relate to the 1992-1995 period. In the first column, we do not find a 
statistically significant relationship between the probability of detecting a spot and the time between 
sunset and sunrise, while controlling for a year-round daily trend in detected spots. The other 
estimated parameters show a positive relationship between air temperature and the probability of 
detecting a spot, and a negative relationship for water temperature and wind speed. In the second 
column, we correct for possible measurement error in our data due to varying use of Universal Time 
and local time by aerial observers. As discussed in Section 3, the difference between the two goes up 
from one to two hours during Daylight Saving Time, the exact dates of which differ between the years. 
We add a Daylight Saving Time-fixed effect and an interaction of the hour-fixed effects with Daylight 
Saving Time to estimation equation (2). This does not alter the results. The findings for 1996-1999 are 
similar (columns 3 and 4). Again, we do not find evidence for temporal displacement.  
 
In line with the discussion of the graphical evidence, we find a statistically significant relationship 
between the probability of detecting a spot and the time that it is dark for the period 2000-2004 
(columns 5 and 6). Relative to the rate at 12pm, it is more than 70 percent higher during the nighttime. 
Based on these parameter estimates, it is not easy to say how much oil was discharged at the nighttime 
rather than the daytime, given the fact that oil tends to remain on the water surface for several hours 
(Section 3). The graphical evidence in Figure 5 suggests that close to all illegal oil discharges occur 
during the nighttime, because all upswings in the probability of detecting a spot are concentrated in 
                                                        
17 In this specification, we do not include time lags to capture the effect of a discharge before sunrise that may 
still be detected after sunrise. The graphical analysis showed that including a time lag is not essential, which is 
why we prefer this simple specification. 
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the nighttime. The size of the other estimated parameters changes compared to the previous period, 
which may be related to oil discharges slowly becoming smaller in volume (Lagring et al. 2012). 
 
For the period 2005-2011, we no longer find a statistically significant relationship between the 
probability of detecting a spot and darkness – even though Figure 5 showed that the graphical pattern 
remained similar to 2000-2004. This is most likely due to the low rate of detected spots during the 
most recent years in our data. The limited variation in the probability of detecting a spot cannot be 
reliably related to the time that it is dark after controlling for a year-round fixed hourly pattern. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper illustrates the relevance of uncovering the dynamics of illegal behavior in response to 
imperfect monitoring and enforcement. For many years, the shipping industry has been suspected 
from shifting illegal oil discharges to the nighttime, when the probability of conviction is effectively 
zero. This conjecture has never been investigated before, however. It is not clear whether the primary 
deterrence technology employed for decades by a great number of western countries, airborne radar, 
has resulted in a tendency for temporal displacement.  
We provide the first empirical evidence that the gap in enforcement only has been actively exploited 
by a significant share of shipping traffic after 1999, when regulations of oily waste discharges in the 
North Sea area were tightened. Prior to this regulatory change, a substantial part of illegal oil 
discharges occurred during the nighttime, but the hourly pattern in oil-like spots on the surface is found 
not to be robust to the wild swings in the time of sunset and sunrise during the year. A more likely 
explanation for the tendency to discharge at relatively late or early hours are the year-round daily 
routines on board driven by the schedule of watches. Only after 1999, with further tightening of the 
regulations and a considerable drop in the overall level of discharges, did the hourly pattern in 
discharges become robust to the variation in time of sunset and sunrise. In these years displacement 
to the nighttime is all but complete. Our findings suggest that most shipping companies chose to stop 
illegal oil discharges in the North Sea area rather than to displace them to the nighttime. 
The findings are relevant to all coastal countries with shipping traffic along the coast. Marine oil 
pollution is a worldwide problem – and remains so even after a period of prolonged decline after 
regulations came in place in the beginning of the 1980s. Highly advanced remote sensing technologies 
based on airborne radar and satellite imagery that is employed in the Netherlands, but also in many 
other nations including the US, Canada and France, may have had a deterrent effect, but may push 
illegal discharges towards times where deterrence is ineffective. We find this tendency to be limited, 
but our findings may be conditional on other policies that put downward pressure on the overall level 
of discharges, including mandated changes in ship design, better facilities for legal disposal in the 
harbor, strengthened port state control and educational efforts to foster greater environmental 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
 Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
Spot (*1,000) 0.63 25.01 0 1 
Darkness 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Water temperature (⁰C)  11.95 4.55 3.80 20.80 
Air temperature (⁰C) 11.05 5.33 -8.80 28.30 
Wind speed (m/s) 8.05 3.49 2.00 20.6 
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Daylight Saving 
Time-offset 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Number of grid 
cells 
2,792 2,792 2,293 2,293 2,792 2,792 2,756 2,756 
Number of 
observations 
1,871,580 1,871,580 2,256,327 2,256,327 2,744,315 2,744,315 3,887,475 3,887,475 
Note. Coefficients * 1,000. Based on data by grid cell and hour. Not shown are coefficients for grid-fixed effects, 
year-fixed effects, month-fixed effects and hour-fixed effects. Standard errors between parentheses are 






Figure 1. Flight intensity above the Dutch Continental Shelf, 1992-2011 
 
 
Note. Flight intensity is defined as the average number of times per year that a grid cell was patrolled during 
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Figure 2. Radar-identified spots per grid cell-hour, Dutch Continental Shelf, 1992-2011 
 
 
Note. Incidence is defined as the number of yearly identified spots per grid cell per hour. The grid cell size is 2.5 




























Figure 3. Average yearly incidence of radar-identified spots, Dutch Continental Shelf, 1992-2011 
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Figure 4. Average incidence of detected spots and flight intensity, by hour of the day, Dutch 
Continental Shelf, 1992-2011 
 
 
Note. Incidence is defined as the number of yearly identified spots per grid cell by hour of the day. Flight intensity 
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Figure 5. Estimated probability of detecting a spot, by season 
 












Note. Graphs plots hour-fixed effects α and α´ from
 estim
ation equation (1), w
ith the probability of detecting 
a spot relative to 12 pm
 on the vertical axis. The intercept is the average probability of detecting a spot at 
12pm
 during selected calendar years. Based on data by grid cell and hour for the Dutch Continental Shelf.  
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